AGRIBUSINESS IN THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCIAL CRISIS Glenn H. Glover
The current agricultural crisis has im-billion is left for capital expenditures and pacted virtually every aspect of agribusiness. farm family expenses. With 2 million farmers Many sectors of the general economy not in the United States, the $13 billion averages directly linked to agribusiness have also felt to $6,500 per farm family for living and the crisis. Information provided in this dis-capital investment requirements during the cussion is intended to: facilitate understand-year. It is obvious that this level of annual ing of the current financial situation in income reflects a crisis situation in terms of agriculture, identify factors that have con-cash flow. tributed to the situation, and explore alterDuring September 1985, there were native strategies for agribusiness firms.
124,909 active borrowers of funds from the The current financial crisis in agribusiness Farmers Home Administration for farm ownmight be described in several ways. To sim-ership in the United States (USDA (c)). These plify this review, consider that a financial borrowers had principal outstanding at that crisis exists when available financial re-time of $7.5 billion. Twenty-one percent of sources are not adequate to meet current these borrowers were delinquent on repayfinancial obligations. From the short-term ment of their loans. The amount of unpaid perspective, it is a problem of inadequate principal outstanding for the delinquent borcash flow. Over a longer term, a financial rowers was $1.8 billion which represented crisis is a problem of inadequate assets.
25 percent of the total unpaid principal for In 1985, farmers in the United States had all active borrowers from FmHA. The delindebt of about $210 billion for real estate and quent amount was $344 million or 19 pernon real estate, Table 1 . This compares with cent of the total amount outstanding by the about $92 billion 10-years ago. At a 14 per-delinquent borrowers. Loans in other catecent interest rate, the annual interest payment gories such as emergency and economic opon this debt would be $29.4 billion. If the portunity had higher delinquency rates than $110 billion owed on farm real estate had the farm ownership loans. Individual rural an average repayment period of 25 years, the housing loans by the FmHA, where payments annual principal repayment would be of near are made monthly by the borrowers, had a $4.4 billion. If the $100 million of non real estate debt were repaid in 3 years, the annual farm income during the early 1970's fueled delinquency rate of 20 percent during Sep-farmers' expectations and placed upward tember 1985, Table 2 .
pressures on farmland prices. The upward Delinquency rates experienced by the trend was reversed in the early 1980s. From FmHA varied substantially by state. In Geor-1981-85, land prices dropped dramatically, gia, the farm ownership loans were 31 per-. Figure 3 . In some states, the decline was cent delinquent during September 1985 and more than 50 percent. Repercussions from the individual rural housing loans with this decline are currently being addressed by monthly payments were 23 percent delin-farm lending institutions and the Farm Credit quent. Iowa had a farm ownership delin-System. quency rate of 19 percent and an individual Higher commodity prices followed by rural housing delinquency rate was 15 per-higher land prices during the 1970s also cent. Most other midwestern states had rates caused a shift in the liquidity of farmers. This in this range.
shift affected their ability to repay borrowed The crisis of asset value relative to debt is funds during the 1980s. During the 1970s, made obvious by the asset-to-debt ratio from liquid assets such as livestock were sold and fixed assets such as land and large machinery of $26.2 billion in total output, 327,000 were bought. jobs, and $6.4 billion in personal income Another measure of financial health for (GAO, p. 40) . businesses is the rate of return on equity.
Fertilizer use during 1985 was down 9.2 The return for the farm sector has a history percent from the high of 53.99 million gross of wide fluctuations, but 1981 was the first tons sold during 1981. The decline was 8.5 time in the recent past that it was negative, percent on a primary nutrient content basis, Figure 4 . Both low income and the decline sumption during the past 4 years was down applying it to total farm production expend-1.75 million tons. itures, as estimated by USDA, we get indiDemand for other farm inputs is influenced cations that total bad debt losses in the United by the acreage planted to major crops, Table States were nearly $7 billion over the past 4 5. This indicates that the demand for inputs years, (USDA (a)), Table 6 . This partially used in production peaked in 1980 and 1981 explains the dilemma that many farm supply and bottomed out in 1983. firms face at the present time. Bad debt losses by agribusiness firms were also substantial during the past few years. By ALTERNATIVES FOR AGRIBUSINESS using the ratio of bad debt losses to volume from a small sample of farm supply firms and There appears to be three basic alternative strategies for agribusiness to consider in can be realized or exiting the industry. Many firms that operate wholesale and retail farm are primarily in the poultry and livestock supply businesses have made and are still areas that use large quantities of feed. The making adjustments to accomplish desired demand for poultry meat has increased about efficiencies. Other firms in that segment have 4 percent annually since 1983. Lower feed exited either voluntarily or involuntarily.
ingredient costs helped keep broiler costs Some agribusinesses have actually bene-and retail prices at bargain levels and thus fited from depressed commodity prices. These stimulate demand. In summary, a crisis exists in a major part 
